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Abstract—The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has emerged as a1
new spin-off research theme from traditional vehicular ad hoc2
networks. It employs vehicular nodes connected to other smart3
objects equipped with a powerful multisensor platform, commu-4
nication technologies, and IP-based connectivity to the Internet,5
thereby creating a possible social network called Social IoV6
(SIoV). Ensuring the required trustiness among communicating7
entities is an important task in such heterogeneous networks,8
especially for safety-related applications. Thus, in addition to9
securing intervehicle communication, the driver/passengers hon-10
esty factor must also be considered, since they could tamper11
the system in order to provoke unwanted situations. To bridge12
the gaps between these two paradigms, we envision to connect13
SIoV and online social networks (OSNs) for the purpose of14
estimating the drivers and passengers honesty based on their15
OSN profiles. Furthermore, we compare the current location of16
the vehicles with their estimated path based on their historical17
mobility profile. We combine SIoV, path-based and OSN-based18
trusts to compute the overall trust for different vehicles and their19
current users. As a result, we propose a trust-aware communi-20
cation architecture for social IoV (TACASHI). TACASHI offers21
a trust-aware social in-vehicle and intervehicle communication22
architecture for SIoV considering also the drivers honesty factor23
based on OSN. Extensive simulation results evidence the effi-24
ciency of our proposal, ensuring high detection ratios >87% and25
high accuracy with reduced error ratios, clearly outperforming26
previous proposals, known as RTM and AD-IoV.27
Index Terms—Human factor, Social Internet of Vehicles (SIoV),28
trust, vehicular ad hoc network (VANET).29
I. INTRODUCTION30
MANY applications have been realized through vehic-31 ular networks as a result of communication among32
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vehicles and/or the infrastructure [1]. These applications are 33
abstractly classified into safety and nonsafety related appli- 34
cations. The former class of applications exhibit stringent 35
requirements, such as delay-critical, security-critical, trust- 36
critical, and decision-critical features, whereas the latter class 37
of applications have relatively less stringent requirements. 38
Nevertheless, many of these applications represent a decision- 39
aided system where the final decision (usually taken by the 40
human drivers) have a direct effect on the outcome of the deci- 41
sion. Therefore, the trustworthiness of the information and the 42
source of information is of prime importance. 43
In Internet of Vehicles (IoV) paradigm, each vehicle is 44
considered as a smart object equipped with a powerful mul- 45
tisensor platform, communications technologies, computation 46
units, IP-based connectivity to the Internet, and to other vehi- 47
cles either directly or indirectly. In addition, a vehicle in 48
IoV is envisioned with a multicommunication model, enabling 49
the interactions among intravehicle components, intervehi- 50
cles, vehicle-to-infrastructure, and vehicles-to-people. IoV also 51
enables the acquisition and processing of large amount of data 52
from versatile geographical areas via intelligent vehicles com- 53
puting platforms, to offer various categories of services for 54
road safety and other services to drivers and passengers [2]. 55
To this end, the communication of vehicles with differ- 56
ent entities in IoV exhibit social features at par with the 57
traditional social networks where the nodes share informa- 58
tion. More precisely, Social IoV (SIoV) are a breed of 59
socially aware ephemeral networks [3], where vehicular nodes 60
share/exchange information with different entities and thus- 61
forth comparable with the traditional social networks. On the 62
other hand, with the emergence of 5G technology, almost all 63
Internet services can be accessed anytime and anywhere [4]. 64
In addition, vehicles’ mobility patterns can be easily estimated 65
through its history profiles and the drivers’ social interactions 66
and hobbies. Hence, the SIoV system can trigger a possible 67
event, which would advocate for verification of the situation, 68
resulting in stolen vehicle alert an alert or even, text the vehi- 69
cle’s owner. It is indeed possible that there could be false 70
alarms; however, more insights are needed to this issue. 71
To fill the gaps, in this paper, we propose a novel SIoV com- 72
munication architecture that takes advantage of online social 73
networks (OSNs) to enhance the SIoV trust establishment by 74
considering the human and location-related honesty (LRH). 75
We leverage the group-trust metric adopted by Advogato,1 76
1[Online]. Available: http://www.advogato.org/
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attempting to determine the maximum set of trusted peers,77
while minimizing the influence of unreliable dishonest peers78
during communication [5]. Afterward, an honesty-related clas-79
sification (i.e., good, bad, or compromised) is associated to80
every node (driver/passenger) and vehicle location depending81
on the Advogato classification of this node (i.e., either trusted82
or distrusted) and the location tracking system, respectively.83
In addition, in-vehicle interdevice communications are secured84
using a lightweight technique based on Chaotic Maps.85
Furthermore, the intervehicle trust is also estimated,86
combined with the discrete recommendations from RSUs87
and trusted authorities (TAs). Finally, the Advogato results88
are used to probabilistically identify honest and dishonest89
drivers/passengers. Using this strategy, the aim is not just to90
reduce both the detection error ratios and also the ratio of91
doubtful nodes that the intervehicle trust could not classify92
them to either trusted or distrusted peers but also to prevent93
unwanted situations, such as stolen vehicles thanks to the LRH94
estimation.95
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are as follows.96
1) We propose a trust-aware communication architecture97
for social IoV (TACASHI), which offers a trust-aware98
social in-vehicle and intervehicle communication archi-99
tecture for SIoVs.100
2) Secure in-vehicle communications are guaranteed101
through Chaotic Maps.102
3) Drivers’ honesty consideration using their OSN profiles103
reached through a trusted middleware.104
4) Vehicles movement-related honesty estimation through105
the use of their historical mobility patterns and a path106
prediction algorithm.107
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In108
Section II, we present some background in vehicular ad hoc109
network (VANET), IoV, OSNs, and trust establishment in both110
kinds of networks. Afterward, in Section III, we present an111
overview of our proposal, followed by its details in Section IV.112
TACASHI’s dishonesty detection process is then discussed in113
Section V. Section VI presents our simulation environment,114
followed by the discussion of the results obtained. Finally, the115
conclusions are drawn at the end of this paper.116
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART117
Trust establishment in vehicular networks is essential for118
the realization of efficient secure applications. Various solu-119
tions have adopted trust modeling to enhance the intervehicle120
communications for VANETs, IoV, and SIoV. In this section,121
we provide an overview of the main features of socially aware122
networking, as well as the existing trust-based solutions in123
these domains.124
A. Social Trust and Socially Aware Networking125
The proliferation of hand-held devices demands mobile car-126
riers to provide instant connectivity. Moreover, the movements127
of the users are generally related to their social behaviors and128
relationships, and the mobility patterns of mobile devices car-129
ried by these users are strongly coupled with their movements.130
Thus, mobile networks are nowadays more human-centric. As131
a result, a new field called socially aware networking has sur- 132
faced that takes the human behavior into account [6]. This new 133
paradigm of social-awareness is applicable to many types of 134
internode interaction-based networks, such as ad hoc networks 135
and its different breeds. 136
B. Trust in OSNs 137
As aforementioned, trust establishment is primarily impor- 138
tant for enhancing the security of different networks and 139
many solutions used trust establishment mechanisms for 140
OSNs [7], [8]. The general trust establishment solutions for 141
OSNs are based on either Advogato trust metric [5] or 142
PageRank-based solutions [9]. 143
Generally, trust for OSNs can be classified using three com- 144
plementary phases: 1) trust information collection; 2) trust 145
evaluation; and 3) trust information dissemination. To identify 146
how honest and trustful is a profile owner, social trust is based 147
on a scalar estimation using the personal profile information, 148
which includes user identity and interactions with other users. 149
Once this social trust is estimated, it will be provided to the 150
end users in different forms and for different purposes. 151
C. Trust in VANETs and IoV 152
In the VANET context, trust management schemes are gen- 153
erally classified as entity-based, content-based, and hybrid 154
models following the targeted adversary, which can be dis- 155
honest entities, malicious messages, or both [10]. Several 156
works in the literature addressed entity-based trust models. 157
Yang’s [11] solution is based on revocation of the nodes that 158
sent falsified or fake information using different techniques. 159
Haddadou et al. [12] chose to associate a credit value to 160
each neighbor vehicle that will increase or decrease depend- 161
ing on the messages credibility of the concerned neighbor’s. 162
Hence, this credit will be quickly decreased when replaying 163
or injecting new (potentially false or malicious) messages. 164
For content-based trust management, Gurung et al. [13] 165
adopted three metrics to classify the received messages into 166
either legal or malicious messages; these metrics are con- 167
tent similarity, content conflict, and routing path similarity. 168
However, in addition to its high time complexity, this solution 169
does not take into account the high level of mobility exhibited 170
by VANET nodes and the node sparsity. On the other hand, 171
our previous hybrid models [14], [15] focus mainly on facing 172
denial-of-service and coalition attacks in VANETs using the 173
standardized messaging service. However, the additional traf- 174
fic generated by the recommendation requests/responses might 175
affect some safety-related applications. Additionally, few solu- 176
tions addressing trust issues in the IoV have also been recently 177
published [16]. 178
Hossain et al. [17] proposed a trust model for collect- 179
ing evidence from IoV infrastructures, store them in vehicles 180
tamper-proof devices, and then start intervehicle trust-based 181
communication. The main limitation of such approach is that 182
the behavior of vehicles may change. Thus, trust information 183
values should remain static over time. In addition, authors 184
did not evaluate the performance in a realistic environment 185
implementing the different low-layer features of VANETs. 186
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Unlike existing trust models, Gai et al. [18] proposed a187
trust management system for SIoV called RTM where each188
node stores its own reputation information rated by others189
during past transactions. They introduced a CA server to190
ensure the integrity and the undeniability of the trust informa-191
tion. However, besides the additional cost of the introduced192
server, this scheme may not be effective in rural scenarios or193
low-density scenarios. Furthermore, as like in other existing194
solutions, the human honesty factor is not considered.195
D. Trust Computation in Vehicular Networks and OSNs196
Due to the distributed and ephemeral nature of vehicu-197
lar networks, every vehicle locally evaluates its neighbors’198
trust. This trust computation can be carried out either in a199
scalar way, using the piggybacked opinions within exchanged200
messages, or through clustered and group-based collaboration201
among vehicles located in a same area [19]. Whereas, trust202
in OSNs requires having a sink or a third trusted party who203
is responsible for evaluating the trust for different peers. This204
sink can either handle the whole task of trust computation, or205
it can distribute such task among secondary sinks, which are206
typically community leaders [20].207
In the light of the existing works, there is a still a huge208
gap between the requirements of the trust-based communi-209
cation in SIoV and the existing solutions. To fill the gaps,210
we propose a novel trust-based SIoV communication archi-211
tecture (namely, TACASHI), which besides the intervehicle212
trust establishments evaluates also their drivers and move-213
ment honesty. Furthermore, TACASHI also offers a secure and214
lightweight in-vehicle communication strategy.215
III. TACASHI OVERVIEW216
Establishing SIoV trust with the incorporation of the human217
honesty factor should be achieved by relying on third TAs218
as intermediaries for this information, since these authorities219
are the only ones having the possibility to trace/track vehi-220
cles identities together with their drivers/owners. Accounting221
for the vehicles’ identity is not a problem, as every vehi-222
cle should have a valid certificate and a set of pseudonyms223
provided by the TA. However, matching the driver identity224
and social account with the vehicle identity involves the use225
of other intermediate tools, such as digital fingerprint, eyes226
and voice recognition systems, or a subscriber identification227
module, thus imposing more requirements onto the system.228
Due to the high cost of smart vehicles, and to the probable229
lack of RSUs in rural environments, Android-based platforms,230
including smartphones and tablets have recently emerged as231
an alternative solution to provide vehicular communications.2232
This way, any trusted third authority can be reached using233
different cellular network technologies. This new research area234
is know as heterogeneous vehicular networking [21].235
Fig. 1 represents an overview of our proposed SIoV archi-236
tecture in which, besides passengers, vehicles, roadside units,237
and TAs, we also involve OSNs. The latter are accessed238
2The SmartCarPhone project. [Online]. Available: http://www.grc.upv.es/
SmartCarPhone/
Fig. 1. Proposed SIoV architecture.
Fig. 2. Driver and passengers honesty factor.
through a trusted middleware provided by the network opera- 239
tor, RSUs, or TA like the City Hall. 240
TACASHI architecture involves five main actors: 1) the per- 241
son registered as the vehicle owner; 2) the passengers within 242
the vehicle represented by their connected devices; 3) the 243
vehicles themselves; 4) road side units and TAs; and 5) the 244
OSN accounts connected to the driver and passengers’ devices. 245
In addition, a path prediction algorithm [22] is also used to 246
estimate and judge the current vehicle locations. 247
IV. TACASHI’S TRUST ESTABLISHMENT 248
As mentioned in the previous sections, our proposal involves 249
drivers’ honesty (see Fig. 2), vehicles’ honesty (see Fig. 3), 250
and vehicles’ LRH (see Fig. 4). Before detailing how these 251
factors are computed in the following sections, the next 252
section presents the proposed in-vehicle interdevice secure 253
communication process. 254
A. In-Vehicle Interdevices Authentication Process 255
In order to enable OSN-based trust, while preserving 256
drivers/owners privacy, the department of motor vehicles 257
(DMV) initializes the OBU by performing a number of oper- 258
ations. First, the driver enters its anonymized OSN account 259
and the DMV registers it against the user. DMV also issues a 260
number of pseudonyms to user a, i.e., {IDa1, IDa2, . . . , IDan}. 261
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Fig. 3. Vehicles honesty factor.
Fig. 4. LRH factor.
In-vehicle device/passengers in TACASHI are required to262
pass the authentication process before gaining access to the263
different network operations. If these devices fail to be authen-264
ticated, they are directly classified as compromised devices, as265
shown in Fig. 2.266
We assume that all the devices in a network have an identity267
(IDi), and get the secure token from the TA; this token is268
assumed to be received through a secure channel. All the nodes269
compute the public key (x, Tk(x)) and private key k using270
Chaotic Maps based on Chebyshev polynomials, which are271
known to be less energy consuming than RSA and ECC [23].272
Consider the communication between devices A and B273
with their identities, i.e., IDa and IDb, and their public and274
private key pairs are {(x, Tka(x)), ka} and {(x, Tkb(x)), kb},275
respectively.276
If node A wants to securely communicate with node B, it277
initiates the authentication request as follows.278
1) Node A selects a prime number p and computes the279
value of Tp(x).280
2) Node A sends the message ma = {Ha, Ca} to node B.281
3) After getting the message ma = {Ha, Ca} from node A,282
B decrypts Ca with the key k = Tt(x) received from TTP,283
and compares the value of PW from the decrypted mes-284
sage with its obtained PW value from TTP. If there is a285
match, then node B concludes that A is an authenticated286
node.287
4) Afterward, it checks the message integrity by computing288
the hash value, and compares it with Ha. If there is289
a match, then B concludes that the message was not 290
altered during the communication. 291
5) Now node B selects the big prime value b and computes 292
the values of Tb(x), Ks, Hb, and Cb. 293
6) Node B sends the message mb = {Hb, Cb, Tb(x)} to 294
node A. 295
7) After getting the message mb = {Hb, Cb, Tb(x)} from 296
node B, A computes the value of Ks = Tpb(x) = 297
Tp(Tb(x)) by using Tb(x) from message mb. Then, node 298
A decrypts Cb with the key Ks, and compares the value 299
of PW from the decrypted message with its obtained 300
PW value from TTP. If there is a match, then node A 301
concludes that B is an authenticated node. 302
8) Afterward, it checks the message integrity by computing 303
the hash value, and compares it with Hb. If there is 304
a match, then B concludes that the message was not 305
altered during the communication. 306
9) Finally, both the nodes A and B agree on an identical 307
session key Ks and further communication is encrypted 308
and decrypted by session key Ks. 309
B. Intervehicle Trust 310
Intervehicle trust is composed of two main metrics: 1) direct 311
trust and 2) indirect trust. 312
The interaction-based trust, i.e., (DirectT(i, j)), of the jth 313
vehicle as evaluated by the ith vehicle, is the ratio of honest 314
actions #H(i, j) to the total number of actions, i.e., both honest 315
and dishonest #All(i, j). It follows that the interaction-based 316
trust is calculated as: 317





H(i, j) + 1
]
. (1) 318
From (1), we can see that 1 − (1/[H(i, j) + 1]) increases 319
with respect to the increased number of honest actions in such 320
a way that several honest actions are needed to increase the 321
interaction-based trust. 322
In our proposal, the intervehicle exchanged opinions (i.e., 323
Indirect trust) are sent together with the unencrypted part of 324
exchanged data messages. To favor the opinions sourced by 325
vehicles considered as trusted, the received recommendations 326
(opinions) sourced by a vehicle k concerning the behavior of 327
a vehicle j [i.e., IndirectTk(i, j)] are combined with respect to 328
the honesty level of the recommender k, as follows: 329
IndirectTk(i, j) =
[
DirectT(i, k) · Recom(k, j)] 12 . (2) 330
Then, the different vehicles’ recommendation about the jth 331
vehicle are combined together to find the global vehicles’ 332











C. Road Side Units Trust 335
Simultaneously with the different intervehicle interactions, 336
whenever a vehicle joins the communication range of an RSU, 337
it sends its different neighbors overall trust to the road side 338
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Fig. 5. Capacity assignment example.
unit. Afterward, the RSU combines all vehicles reports to build339
a quasi-global evaluation of the behavior of vehicles moving340
around.341
Following (4), the roadside units compute their opinion342
regarding any vehicle j through the combination of the reports343









where n represents the number of vehicles having previously346
evaluated the jth vehicle.347
D. Location-Related Trust348
TACASHI classifies the LRH of a given vehicle through349
a similarity measurement between the current position and350
the estimated position, based on their historical mobility pat-351
terns [22]. Social events, such as soccer games, festivities,352
and emergency cases are also taken into account for the path353
estimation (see Fig. 4).354
E. Social Networks Trust: Using the Advogato Trust Metric355
to Identify Trustable People356
Various social networking aspects have been studied by an357
online, free software developers community called Advogato.358
This community, launched in 1999, has adopted a group-trust359
metric trying to determine the largest set of honest peers, while360
minimizing the influence of unreliable/dishonest ones [5].361
Advogato uses a social graph to represent the different peers362
and relations in the network. Each peer in the graph represents363
a user’s account, whereas a directed edge represents a relation364
(also called “certification”).365
The Advogato trust metric stands on the network flow. It366
first assigns a “capacity” Ci to every peer i, which represents a367
nonincreasing function of the distance separating the peer i and368
the seed, as returned by the considered searching (breath-first369
algorithm). For instance, “advogato.org” assigns a 20 capacity370
for the seed, then 7 for the following two levels, 2 for peers371
belonging to the third level, and so on (see Fig. 5).372
Each node A is then divided into two sides, i.e., A− and373
A+, with a capacity−1 edge from A to the sink, and a capacity374
of (Ci−1) edge from A− to A+, respectively. Finally, the375
certification of A to B becomes an infinite-capacity edge from376
A+ to B− (see Fig. 6).377
To find the maximum flow [24], Advogato is based on the378
Ford–Fulkerson algorithm (see Fig. 7). Since Ford–Fulkerson379
Fig. 6. Conversion into a single source, single sink.
Fig. 7. Network flow computation.
Fig. 8. Nodes classification.
selects the shortest increasing path from the current node to 380
the seed, any node having a flow from x− to x+ possesses also 381
a flow from x− to the sink. Ford–Fulkerson takes O(|f +||E|), 382
where f is the maximum flow. In this graph, f + is the number 383
of accepted peers. 384
Concerning the trusted accounts identification, an adversary 385
model should be defined first. Then, the minimum cut is cre- 386
ated to distinguish between trusted, doubted, and compromised 387
accounts, as shown in Fig. 8. The graph’s minimum cut (i.e., 388
a partition of the nodes of a graph into two or more—k-cut— 389
disjoint subsets that are joined by at least one edge) is the one 390
that is minimal in some sense (trust value in our case). We note 391
that the Advogato trust metric has a wide range of applications, 392
meaning that edges and connections can be defined in different 393
ways, including, for instance, communities, friendship, shared 394
posts, comments, or likes. 395
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Algorithm 1 Overall Intervehicle Trust Computation
1: if There is an RSU OR traffic is delay-sensitive then
2: Tr(i, j) = [DirectT(i, j) · RV(i, j)] 12 ;
3: else
4: if There is an RSU AND the exchanged traffic is
partially delay-sensitive then
5: Tr(i, j) = [DirectT(i, j) · RR(j)] 12 ;
6: else
7: if There is an RSU AND the exchanged traffic is
delay-tolerant then
8: Tr(i, j) = TAD(j);
9: else
10: if j is a dubious node (i.e, 0.4 ≥ Tr(i, j) ≥ 0.6)
then





V. TACASHI’S DISHONESTY DETECTION PROCESS396
In addition to the direct and recommendation-based trust,397
TACASHI involves also the driver’s honesty factor based on398
their OSN profiles. This information is received through the399
trusted middleware, which for our case can be the TA, the400
deployed RSUs, or even network operators. Furthermore, the401
vehicles’ LRH is also taken into account in the overall trust402
evaluation.403
If a vehicle has already demonstrated its honesty, and404
thereby benefits from an high trust value, there is no need to405
take the driver’s honesty factor into account, and vice versa.406
Thus, nodes requiring the human honesty factor as comple-407
mentary data should be only those nodes whose behavior is408
unclear/compromised.409
Depending on the OSNs, and having trust computed through410
the Advogato trust metric, the TA matches, for each vehi-411
cle identity, an honesty factor called honesty human factor412
(HHF), which refers to the human trust factor of the current413
driver. This factor varies within the range of [−0.5,−0.2] for414
the drivers judged as bad, [−0.2, 0] for the drivers judged as415
compromised, and [0,+0, 2] for the drivers judged as good.416
Whereas, the overall trust is in the range of [0, 1].417
In addition, using a path prediction algorithm [22], the LRH418
factor is also considered.419
Similarly to the HHF, the LRH varies in the range of420
[−0.5,−0.2] for the positions judged as bad, [−0.2, 0] for the421
positions that are compromised, and [0,+0, 2] for the posi-422
tions judged as good. Once the soliciting vehicles receive the423
HHF and LRH for neighbors they have concerns about, the424
trust computation will follow Algorithm 1. In this algorithm,425
Tr(i, j) is the global intervehicle trust, RV(i, j) is the recom-426
mendation coming from a nearby vehicle, RR(RSU, j) is the427
recommendation requested and received from a nearby road428
side unit, and, finally, RT(TA, j) is the TA evaluation about the429
jth vehicle’s honesty.430
The trust evaluation Tr(i, j) is assessed after every update to 431
keep it within the range [0, 1]. Using this strategy, the number 432
of dubious nodes will be reduced. Thus, a decision about the 433
vehicles’ trustiness can be made. The latter is made by using 434
the different vehicles reports to generate a blacklist of the 435
detected misbehaving vehicles, i.e., 436
RSUBlacklist = ∀j (5) 437
Card(j/ Tr(i, j) ≤ 0.5)
Card(RC(j))
≥ DThreshold (6) 438
where DThreshold represents the threshold beyond which a 439
vehicle is blacklisted. This threshold is compared with the ratio 440
of negative reports about the jth vehicle to the total number 441
of reports. 442
The TA’s recommendations are in fact decisions that must 443
be followed by the different sublevels (RSUs and vehicles). 444
It makes a decision TAD(j) about the jth vehicle. TA deci- 445
sions are used only for nondelay-sensitive applications, as they 446
involve all the lower level evaluations, thus implying additional 447










where n represents the number of RSUs having previously 451
evaluated the jth vehicle. 452
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 453
Our proposal is implemented in the NS-2.35 simulator. In 454
addition, we used the same dataset as in [25]. This dataset, 455
called Epinions [26], has 131 828 nodes (users) and 841 372 456
edges (honest or malicious). We also consider that 30% of the 457
edges represent a distrust relationship, and they are toward the 458
10% and 20% vehicles considered as dishonest. Hence, we 459
considered in every case 10% of false evaluations (false pos- 460
itives). We selected the first 400 nodes that have more than 461
40 out-neighbors, and we randomly matched their identities 462
to 400 vehicle identities. Thus, every vehicle driver is repre- 463
sented by a node within the used dataset. Furthermore, in every 464
vehicle, we have four devices, being one of them assumed 465
unknown. 466
For VANET settings, the traffic is generated using the 467
Citymob mobility model [27]. In our case, we used a 4 km2 468
map of Laghouat city in Algeria. The generated vehicles path 469
of 80% of the vehicles to enable the paths prediction. For the 470
20% remaining vehicles, half of them are moving toward pre- 471
defined positions called emergency location and event location 472
(i.e., hospital, soccer stadium, and so on), and the other half 473
are assumed to move to unpredictable positions. The scenario 474
has four randomly deployed RSUs. We run our simulation for 475
a duration of 1000 s 15 times to reach the 95% confidence 476
level. In addition, the vehicles communication range is set 477
300 m and they are moving with a speed varying in the range 478
of [0, 80] km/h. Finally, ten randomly chosen vehicles send 479
four data packets of 256 bytes each every second. 480
In the following, we will compare the obtained dishon- 481
esty detection ratios to ones of RTM [18] and AD-IoV [28]. 482
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Fig. 9. Detection performance without the drivers honesty consideration.
Fig. 10. Detection performance when considering the HF.
Afterward, we will analyze the generated error ratios with and483
without the use of our proposed OSN-aided trust architecture.484
For the detection performance we also studied both cases,485
with and without human factor considerations. Fig. 9 rep-486
resents the obtained detection ratio without using HHF for487
10% and 20% of dishonest vehicles with respect to time,488
respectively. It shows that, although the average detection ratio489
exceeds the 90% for 10% of malicious nodes, the confidence490
interval is quite large, reaching the 5% at the end of the vari-491
ous runs. This is mainly because of the doubtful behavior of492
some peers that must be classified as behaving good or bad.493
On the other hand, when the human factor is considered (see494
Fig. 10), the detection ratio reaches up to 96% for 10% of495
dishonest vehicles, and 93% for the 20% case, with clearly496
more reduced confidence intervals.497
Compared to the detection ratios achieved by RTM and498
AD-IoV, both TACASHI versions with (i.e., TACASHI+)499
and without (i.e., TACASHI-) driver’s honesty consideration500
achieved higher detection ratios. Even more, with TACASHI+501
the obtained detection ratios reach almost optimal perfor-502
mance, as depicted in Fig. 11. This is mainly due to the503
incorporation of OSN to enhance the trust establishment and,504
thus, reduce the detection error ratios.505
Confirming the previous results, the number of generated506
false positives with respect of time is optimized by more than507
3%, with more reduced confidence intervals compared to the508
case where the driver factor is not considered (see Fig. 12).509
However, the generated error ratio by both RTM and AD-IoV510
Fig. 11. Detection performance of TACASHI with and without considering
the HF compared to RTM and AD-IoV.
Fig. 12. Generated false positives by TACASHI with and without considering
the HF compared to RTM and AD-IoV.
Fig. 13. TACASHI’s introduced delay to compute HF and the LRH.
is quite high, reaching up to 10% for AD-IoV, which may 511
cause some undesired situations. 512
Although the use of the OSNs and path prediction algo- 513
rithms through the trusted middleware has enhanced the 514
overall trust establishment, it is still prone to cause some 515
additional delay which becomes unacceptable for safety appli- 516
cations. Fig. 13 presents the required computation delay of the 517
drivers’ honesty from OSNs and vehicles LRH through the 518
trusted middleware. It shows that, on average, and based on 519
the drivers honesty estimation, our proposal requires up to 5 s 520
in the worst case. Indeed, this delay is not acceptable for IoV 521
safety applications, but still it is considered reduced enough to 522
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prevent terrorist attacks or stolen vehicles. For the latter case,523
simulation results show that we can decide whether the cur-524
rent position of a given vehicle is normal or abnormal within525
less than 2 s in the worst case.526
VII. CONCLUSION527
IoV is composed of smart IP-based objects having connec-528
tivity to both the Internet and to other vehicles, forming a529
social network called SIoVs. Ensuring secure communication530
among these vehicles and their embedded devices is an essen-531
tial requirement of SIoV, especially when these communica-532
tions are related to safety applications. In this paper, we aimed533
at the trust-driven security mechanism for SIoV and proposed534
a novel trust-aware social in-vehicle and intervehicle commu-535
nications architecture for SIoVs called TACASHI. In addition536
to the intervehicle trust establishment and lightweight secure537
in-vehicle communications, TACASHI also involves OSNs to538
estimate the honesty of vehicles’ drivers. Furthermore, the his-539
torical mobility traces of the vehicles are stored and then540
used to estimate their future path, while also considering541
some exceptions, such as emergency situations and events.542
Simulation results demonstrate the performance of the pro-543
posed TACASHI at ensuring high misbehavior detection ratios544
clearly outperforms previous solutions known as RTM and545
AD-IoV.546
As future work, we plan to add another social dimen-547
sion to our architecture by also accounting for the trustiness548
of unmanned aerial vehicles, and their interactions with the549
vehicles and devices on the ground.550
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